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THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE DUTCH EXTREME RIGHT:  
DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES AND SUPPORT FOR THE CENTER 








This article seeks to explain why the Dutch extreme-right party, Center Democrats (CD), 
never succeeded in breaking out of its marginal position. It argues that, in addition to analy-
zing fluctuations in electoral support, scholars should also examine the degree to which 
extreme-right parties are able to express their views in the mass media. Supply-side explana-
tions are extended by showing that discursive political opportunities need to be openly 
acknowledged and debated publicly to become relevant. Relying on longitudinal data derived 
from political claims analysis and opinion polls, this article demonstrates that negative public 
reactions significantly eroded the electoral attractiveness of the extreme-right party. In 
contrast, when one’s goal is to achieve mass media access, the results reveal that any pub-
licity is favorable publicity. Public criticism enhanced the CD’s access to the public debate. 
Also, rising support in opinion polls led to more public claim making. Remarkably, however, 
the extreme right party did not increase its electoral support when it made itself more promin-




One of the key questions for scholars of contemporary politics is the emergence and rise of 
extreme right-wing parties. Despite the definitional debate in the literature, a consensus has 
emerged that these parties should be grouped into one single party family (Arzheimer 2009).1 
The most important common denominator of these parties is their anti-immigrant stance and 
ethnocultural notion of citizenship, reflected in the idea of “own people first” (e.g., Betz 1994; 
Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). Moreover, these parties also have a common anti-
establishment rhetoric (e.g., Carter 2005).  
The most appealing and successful extreme-right parties get ample attention, but it might 
easily be forgotten that the vast majority fail to break through or remain marginal and short 
lived. For a full understanding of why political mobilization against migrants is sometimes 
successful, we should also focus on the broad range of attempts that never succeed. The 
Netherlands is a very interesting case in point, because a significant electoral performance of 
the far right never took place until relatively recently—despite a sufficient electoral reservoir 
and favorable opportunity structure, which had been in place for some time. Right-wing 
parties List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and, following its footsteps, Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) 
achieved considerable levels of support. Moreover, they attracted widespread media publicity. 
The ability of these two parties to express their views in the public debate and to gain 
substantial electoral support constitutes a remarkable contrast with the situation in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The right-wing Centrumdemocraten (Center Democrats, hereafter: CD), headed by 
Hans Janmaat, experienced some ups and downs but never succeeded in obtaining a strong 
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voice in the mass media, nor in mobilizing and consolidating significant electoral support. 
The central aim of this article is to explain why the CD remained a “marginal phenomenon” 
(Lucardie 2000) and failed to break out of this position. 
At the start of the 1990s, the CD had experienced a long period of “stable marginality” 
(Scheepers, Eisinga, and Lammers 1994: 93). After 1991, this started to change. The unofficial 
and silent agreement between the mainstream political parties of “hushing-up” the CD was 
questioned by political commentators. Beginning in March 1993, the party experienced an 
electoral wave. Subsequently, media access increased considerably, but a wave of negative 
reactions appeared as well. The expectations for the May national elections in 1994 were 
high, but negative publicity, it is argued, toned down the actual outcome (Mudde and Van 
Holsteyn 1994; Van Donselaar 1997). The second half of the decade was characterized by the 
party’s further marginalization and eventual demise. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the 
CD lost the three seats it had achieved in 1994. There has hardly been any activity of the party 
after these elections, and in June 1999 the CD ceased to exist.  
Although the CD has principally sought to exert influence through institutionalized politics, 
there are good reasons to connect two areas of scholarship—social movements and electoral 
studies—and build more bridges between the two literatures (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). 
First, explanations for the fortunes of radical-right parties are very similar to those of social 
movements. They both often rely on the economic market metaphor of demand and supply 
and use the notion of a “political opportunity structure”—i.e., the openness of the political 
system to challengers (e.g., Arzheimer 2009). Second, by neglecting the electoral channel, 
social movement research tends to overlook the most important contemporary collective actors 
mobilizing against the consequences of globalization: the populist radical right (Hutter and 
Kriesi 2013). Social movement protests have generally been dominated by “the left,” while 
the populist radical right mainly relies on the electoral channel when it seeks to mobilize anti-
immigrant sentiments among the “losers of globalization” (Kriesi et al. 2008). We are only 
able to fully grasp the implications of globalization processes and large-scale immigration for 
political contention when we also open our perspective to the electoral channel. 
This study aims to improve our understanding of the performances of right-wing parties 
in three respects. First, and most importantly, I argue that we should not only explain why 
certain extreme-right parties attract more voters than others, but also why these groups are, at 
certain moments, far more successful in having a voice in the public debate in the first place 
(Koopmans and Muis 2009). Thus, success includes two elements: electoral support and public 
claim making. This second criterion for success refers to the degree to which a group is able 
to articulate its political views in the public discourse.  
Second, using a discursive opportunity approach, I differentiate between positive and nega- 
tive coverage and between extreme-right speakers and responses of other actors. Several 
previous studies that investigate the role of the media (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; 
Lubbers and Scheepers 2001; Walgrave and De Swert 2002) examine the amount of coverage 
on the issues related to extreme-right parties (most predominantly, the issue of immigration) 
or the amount of coverage devoted to the party in question. Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, and 
Van Spanje (2012) make a step forward in this regard by distinguishing between the visibility 
of leaders and parties. They rightly suggest that the tone of the coverage should also be 
considered. Indeed, a group’s media standing is not equivalent to the coverage it receives in 
the news: an actor may appear in the media discourse when it is criticized, while having little 
opportunity to express its own views (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht 2002).  
Third, acknowledging that media debates are relatively volatile, I focus on short-term dy-
namics. Much previous research has examined the influence of both individual characteristics 
(such as one’s socioeconomic status) and contextual factors (such as the country’s unemploy-
ment rate) on anti-immigration party support (e.g., Van der Brug and Fennema 2003; Van der 
Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000). While these studies tend to focus on variation across space, 
few scholars have examined variation in extreme-right support across time (Kitschelt 2007).  






EXTREME-RIGHT SUCCESS AND FAILURE: WHY PUBLIC DEBATE MATTERS 
 
There are two major sets of explanations for the emergence and rise of extreme-right political 
behavior, one focusing on grievances and one on political opportunities. This corresponds 
with the metaphor from economics distinguishing “demand-side” and “supply-side” factors 
(Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy 2005; Rydgren 2007). In the social movement 
literature, the opportunity perspective has gained predominance over grievance theories, while 
academic work that focuses on electoral politics often treats extreme-right parties as products 
of demand-side processes (Giugni, Koopmans, Passy, and Statham 2005: 160), in particular 
worsening economic conditions and increasing ethnic competition (e.g., Betz 1994; Ignazi 
2003).  
The grievances perspective cannot fully account for rapid mobilization and de-
mobilization of support and mass media standing (Norris 2005). Therefore, a complete and 
satisfying explanation needs to go beyond the demand-side model. According to supply-side 
theories, successes and failures are mainly shaped by networks, resources of organizations, 
and political opportunities. These factors should be viewed as complementary to, rather than 
competing with, demand-side explanations (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007). The supply 
side can be distinguished by internal factors, like organizational characteristics (De Witte and 
Klandermans 2000; Mudde 2007), and by external factors such as the institutional framework 
and elite responses (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1995). Only the volatile and 
dynamic supply-side factors seem relevant here, as the research question concerns short-term 
developments within one country. Thus, I will not review the role of relatively stable or per-
sistent political opportunities and constraints, which tend to characterize electoral systems. 
Although the concept of political opportunities has been widely used to explain move-
ment success, it should be complemented with the notion that opportunities and constraints, 
such as divisions within elite groups and elite support, need to become visible through public 
statements in order to become relevant (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). The 
public sphere is a restricted communicative space in which a variety of organizations, groups, 
and individuals compete for the scarce resource of attention (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). It 
has more and more become the principal ground for power struggles: political contention 
increasingly consists of a battle over attention and approval in the public debate, like a 
performance on a stage with the electorate as the audience (Manin 1997). As Castells (1997: 
312) puts it: “Outside the media sphere there is only political marginality.” For example, Le 
Pen’s party made its first major electoral breakthrough in France only after it was given 
access to state television (Eatwell 2005), and the rapid rise of Haider’s FPÖ was partly the 
result of favorable coverage from the Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s largest newspaper (Art 2007). 
For the specification of the political opportunity structure to explain the rise and demise in 
extreme-right public standing and electoral support, I will follow the outline of Koopmans 
and colleagues (2005), who distinguish two dimensions: discursive opportunities and political 
space.  
“Political space” refers to the degree to which mainstream parties already occupy the 
electoral terrain of the radical right. Their stances affect the openness of the political system 
to new anti-immigration parties. Here, we need to distinguish issue positions from issue 
salience (e.g., Meguid 2008). Concerning the latter, there are good reasons to expect that an 
increase in the salience of immigration and integration issues positively affects the support 
and media access of anti-immigration parties. The agenda-setting hypothesis holds that issues 
that appear frequently in the news tend to become the issues that voters deem important 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972). Combined with the idea that the electorate is likely to support 
the most credible proponent of a particular issue (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), it 
follows that media publicity for issues that are “owned” by anti-immigration parties enhances 
their electoral attractiveness. 
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However, as for instance Meguid (2008) has argued, an increase in issue salience will 
only lead to an increase in radical-right support when mainstream parties declare hostility 
toward the niche party’s policy position, but not when they employ accommodative tactics. 
Simply put, mainstream parties have three strategies at their disposal: remain silent on the 
particular issue (dismissive), distance itself from anti-immigrant viewpoints (adversarial), or 
adopt a position similar to the niche party’s (accommodative). Meguid (2008) points out that 
if mainstream parties address immigration topics and adopt anti-immigration stances, electoral 
support for far right contenders will diminish. Most scholars similarly argue that when 
mainstream parties adopt restrictive positions on immigration, the extreme right loses out 
(e.g., Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 1995). According to Ignazi (2003: 211), the tough 
position of the Dutch mainstream right party (the conservative liberal VVD) on the 
immigration issue partly explains why the CD lost all seats in the 1998 elections (see also Van 
der Brug et al. 2000). Likewise, my expectation is that restrictive political claim making on 
the immigration and integration issue by other political actors is likely to decrease both 
extreme-right popularity (hypothesis 1A) and presence in the public sphere (hypothesis 1B). 
The notion of “discursive opportunities” means that media discourse not only reflects the 
actual political contention, but it also amplifies and distorts it by ascribing credibility, rele-
vance, and legitimacy to certain actors, issues, and points of view, but not to others (Ferree et 
al. 2002; Koopmans 2004). More specifically, discursive opportunities for extreme-right 
actors consist of three elements: visibility, resonance, and the nature of reactions in the public 
debate (Koopmans 2004). Visibility is defined by the prominence that media gatekeepers 
allocate to a message. Resonance depends upon the degree to which an actor or a message pro-
vokes reactions. Both positive and negative reactions tend to improve discursive opportunities 
by creating either dissonance or consonance. 
I have identified two outcomes that define success for right-wing parties: electoral 
attractiveness and public claim making. With regard to the first dependent variable, electoral 
attractiveness, Lubbers and Scheepers (2001) argue that putting a populist right party into a 
“bad light” is an ineffective way to decrease its popularity, as potential supporters will filter 
the news in favor of their opinion because of selective perception. They conclude that neglec-
ting the extreme-right wing is a more effective way to neutralize these parties than writing 
unfavorably about them, since higher levels of attention for the German extreme right actually 
increased electoral support. However, in the Dutch case, Lubbers (2001) found that media 
attention for extreme-right parties did not affect voting intentions, in striking contrast with the 
conventional wisdom that the collapse of the Dutch extreme right was partly due to a “torrent 
of negative publicity” (Van Donselaar 1997: 6) and “demonization by the media” (Ignazi 2003: 
167). Lubbers’ remarkable finding might be due to the fact that the variable “media attention” 
is a single measurement of overall coverage devoted to the parties in question. Distinguishing 
claim making and visibility from resonance may be the solution to this paradox: counting the 
number of articles taps media access for a party, but it also includes the amount of critical 
reactions. I expect that having the opportunity to communicate to citizens by placing one’s 
topics on the agenda is beneficial. A challenging movement or party will use its voice in the 
media to get its message across—for instance, claims of the CD are expected to inform and 
persuade potential supporters. Thus, I hypothesize that electoral support is enhanced by claim 
making and media visibility of the CD (hypothesis 2A). Receiving coverage or mention in the 
news is not the same as being heard or being directly quoted (Ferree et al. 2002). Extreme 
right groups may not be treated as actors with a relevant or legitimate voice, and may appear 
in the media discourse only when they are mentioned or criticized by others. I expect that 
delegitimization in the public sphere is detrimental for the mobilization of voters, and that 
consonant reactions in the media have a positive effect on public opinion. Put differently, I 
predict that electoral support is enhanced by positive reactions (hypothesis 3A) and is 
decreased by negative reactions (hypothesis 4A).  






The mechanisms that underlie the temporal ups and downs in electoral support do not 
necessarily explain fluctuations in the frequency of public claim making. With regard to this 
second dependent variable, the behavior of journalists plays a pivotal role. Being “silent” or 
fastidious about whether to join a particular debate can be a deliberate tactical choice for some 
organizations (Rohlinger 2006), but this is not an option for challenging groups that have 
limited media access. Movements are generally much more dependent on media than the 
reverse (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). The decisions of journalists to give groups media 
access are shaped by so-called “news values” that indicate if a message is newsworthy 
(Galtung and Ruge 1965). News deals mostly with those who hold power, while challengers 
have more difficulty gaining access and attention (Gans 2004 [1979]; Gitlin 1980). Publicity 
is positively related to the amount of status or “political standing” enjoyed by a particular 
actor (Wolfsfeld and Sheafer 2006). Established parties and state actors almost automatically 
gain ample opportunity to make public claims. Journalists routinely turn to these actors 
because those in charge are expected to respond when something important happens. 
Moreover, those with political standing have at their disposal more of the resources, staff, and 
skills that tend to increase access to media. Thus, I predict that higher levels of electoral 
support increase newsworthiness and opportunities to acquire media access (Jenkins 1999). 
My hypothesis is that electoral support increases the frequency of public claim making of the 
CD  (hypothesis 5). 
Gatekeepers can enhance or diminish the power of those to whom they offer or deny 
standing, because access to the news media can, by itself, become an indicator of power 
(Ferree et al. 2002). The media spotlight validates a challenger as an important player 
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). In Gamson’s (2004: 251) words: “Being visible and quoted 
defines for other journalists and a broader public who really matters.” Thus, I expect contin-
uity: once an actor or message has become headline news, it remains in the media spotlight 
for some time. So claim making and visibility will enhance the potential for an actor to diffuse 
subsequent messages in the public sphere. My hypothesis is higher levels of visibility and 
public claim making in the previous period will increase access to the public debate in the 
following period (hypothesis 2B).  
As I argued above, negative coverage could be harmful for maintaining electoral support. 
In contrast, trying to attract as much attention as possible under the motto “any publicity is 
good publicity” might be a rather successful strategy for gaining a more influential voice in 
the media platform. In line with Koopmans and Olzak (2004), I assume that public reactions 
(whether negative or positive) increase the speaker’s chances to gain more space for subse-
quent messages, as it makes the actor more relevant in the eyes of journalists. It is likely that 
newsworthiness is actually increased by negative attacks, since negative news enters the news 
cycle more easily (Galtung and Ruge 1965). This leads me to expect that both positive 
(hypothesis 3B) and negative (hypothesis 4B) reactions increase the frequency of Janmaat’s 
public claim making.  
Koopmans and Olzak (2004) include all negative responses in their measurement of 
dissonance, so it covers a wide range of public rejections and condemnations directed against 
the extreme right, including state repression. In contrast, I distinguish between repression and 
dissonance, since the impact of repressive actions, like prosecuting movement leaders for hate 
speech, differs from the effect of media coverage (Van Spanje and De Vreese 2015). 
Repression refers to the formal decisions of political elites in dealing with challengers, which 
can be either repressive or facilitative (Kriesi et al. 1995). Although state repression may not 
always have a purely negative effect on mobilization—since it might generate moral shocks, 
solidarity, and motivation among protesters (Almeida 2003)—Koopmans (1997) concludes 
that institutional repression (such as trials and bans of demonstrations) had a clear negative 
impact on the amount of movement activity of the German extreme right in the 1990s. On 
paper, the Netherlands is not a “militant democracy” like Germany as there are no explicit 
repressive actions to defend “the principles of the free democratic order” (Mudde 2004: 197). 
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Nevertheless, the intensification in legal sanctions against racist statements during the 1990s 
might offer an explanation for the collapse of the Dutch extreme right (Van Donselaar 1997). 
What has been unique in the legal approach in the Netherlands is the systematic prohibition of 
public meetings of extreme-right parties and organizations on the ground that these meetings 
endanger “the public order” (Fennema 2000). When the extreme right would ask for permis-
sion to demonstrate in a city, antifascists would announce a countermobilization and the 
mayor would ban the demonstration for fear of public disturbances (Mudde 2004). In con-
clusion, concerning the party’s electoral popularity, I predict that, like other dissonant claims, 
repression has a negative impact (hypothesis 6A). Furthermore, whereas I have hypothesized 
that dissonant claims are beneficial for making one’s voice heard in the media debate, I expect 
that repression is harmful for gaining access to the public discourse (hypothesis 6B). 
Finally, dissonant public reactions come not only from outsiders but also, occasionally, 
from party members. Therefore, the degree of organizational fragmentation will be taken into 
account. I expect that media statements about internal strife harm the party. A political party 
or movement encounters severe problems if it cannot mobilize a sufficient number of loyal 
members or activists (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977). Lack of a well-organized party structure, 
shortfall of membership, and organizational disunity have been proposed as pivotal factors 
that explain why the CD remained in a “circle of organizational weakness” and eventually 
collapsed (De Witte and Klandermans 2000). To conclude, my expectation is that organizational 
fragmentation decreases both electoral popularity (hypothesis 7A) and presence in the public 
sphere (hypothesis 7B). 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Data and Dependent Variables 
 
The period under investigation starts in January 1992 and runs until May 1998. Thus, the 
analysis contains both a period of (moderate) success and the inglorious demise of the CD. 
This temporal frame is cut into two-week units of observations, but I will also conduct ad-
ditional analyses based on weekly units. By aggregating over biweekly and weekly units I am 
able to capture relatively short-term media dynamics. The reason for starting in 1992 is a 
pragmatic one, namely, the ability to make use of an extensive existing dataset for this period, 
which consists of hand-coded political claims analysis data gathered by Koopmans and 
colleagues (2005; see also Koopmans and Statham 1999).2 A political claim is a “strategic action 
in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, 
calls to action, proposals, criticism, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the 
interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 
24). In total, 627 coded political claims were derived from articles in the NRC Handelsblad, 
one of the most prominent daily newspapers in the Netherlands.3  
Relying on Hayes and Krippendorff (2007), an intercoder reliability check of the coding 
of political claims in the Dutch context with three coders revealed that Krippendorff’s alpha 
is, respectively, 0.79 (claim identification) and 0.62 (article selection).4 Furthermore, the 
amount of agreement about the values of the claim-based variables varied from perfect to 
acceptable; Krippendorff’s alpha ranged from 1.00 (claim making by the radical right party; 
resonance) to 0.60 (visibility), with negative immigration claims (0.70) and dissonance (0.87) 
in between.5 Following the guidelines of Krippendorff (2012), some aspects in the coding 
procedure are only slightly below the recommended minimum level of inter-rater reliability 
(alpha > 0.667), so I considered these scores as adequate since the alpha is a strict measure 
(cf. Hanna 2013).  
Comparisons between newspapers reveal that, although there are differences in the rates 
of coverage of claims, there is a striking similarity in the distribution of important charac-
teristics of claims (Koopmans et al. 2005: 261). This confirms other research that concluded 






that, in contrast with the absolute amount of coverage, there are hardly any differences in the 
tone and portrayal of radical-right politicians (Schafraad, Wester, and Scheepers 2009; Bos, 
Van der Brug, and De Vreese 2010). Counting the number of articles between 1986-2004, 
Schafraad (2009) found that, in absolute terms, two highly regarded Dutch newspapers de-
voted more attention to the radical right than the popular Telegraaf—not surprisingly, as the 
latter has simply less news content in general. Relatively speaking, however, he did not ob-
serve differences in the visibility and prominence of the radical right; neither did he find 
empirical support for differences in what he labeled “support attention” and “substantial atten-
tion.” This is in contrast to the expectation of Mazzoleni (2003) that there are significant dif-
ferences between tabloid and elite media.  
The amount of public claim making by the Center Democrats is the count of political claims 
made by the CD, irrespective of the subject. Public opinion support for the Center Democrats 
is the percentage of people that reported the intention to vote for the CD if parliamentary 
elections would be held the next day, using survey data gathered by NIPO (NIPO/Steinmetz-




The variable negative immigration claims measures the number of restrictive claims re-
lated to immigration and integration by all other political actors.6 
Visibility measures the extent to which claims were reported prominently. It is calculated 
as the sum of scores on four elements: the article in which the claim is reported appears on the 
front page, the claim is referred to in the headline of the article, the claim is mentioned as the 
first one in the article, and the claim is repeated in follow-up articles (within two weeks). The 
total amount of prominence during one time period is divided by the total number of claims 
made by the CD.  
Consonance (supportive reactions) and dissonance (critical reactions) capture all political 
reactions to the CD—i.e., all public claims by other actors that are directed to or referring to 
the party, except repression (see below). Resonance also includes indirect reactions, for in-
stance, when someone urges a mayor to not allow a demonstration organized by the extreme-
right party. “Soft” repression and nonstate repression (Linden and Klandermans 2006) are 
also included in this variable. Examples of such “unofficial” repression that appeared in the 
articles include: “The workers union expels a member because of his CD membership”, “An 
owner of a hotel refuses to rent congress facilities for a CD party meeting,” and “The manager 
of a taxi company suspends an employee from duty because he has distributed CD leaflets to 
customers.”  
Claim making by the CD and the count of critical reactions during a period are strongly 
correlated (Pearson’s r is 0.78). We have to conclude that there is a close relationship between 
the frequency of Janmaat’s public statements and the negative reactions of others. Including 
the lagged variables simultaneously in a multivariate regression leads to multicollinearity 
problems. Therefore, the biweekly count of CD claim making is subtracted from the number 
of times Janmaat and his party are criticized. Dissonance is thus the surplus number of 
negative reactions (Pearson’s r is now 0.44). Dissonance is coded zero when there were no 
critical statements referring to Janmaat or his party during a given time period. The variable 
consonance (hypotheses 3A and 3B) will be left out of the analysis, because only 17 suppor-
tive claims were reported during the whole period of study—that is, there is very little vari-
ation over time. The observed lack of consonance is in line with findings of Schafraad et al. 
(2009): a relatively small proportion of all news reports during the election periods in 1994 
and 1998 contain exclusively positive attitudes towards the far right (three and seven percent 
respectively). In my case, about four percent of all claims referring to the CD are supportive 
reactions. 
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My measure of repression by state agencies against the CD includes both institutional 
and situational forms of repression. Institutional repression consists of general decisions taken 
by political authorities (such as a ban of a demonstration by a mayor) or the judiciary (such as 
trials and convictions). Situational repression refers to unplanned, ad hoc actions of the police, 
such as arrests of CD members during a demonstration. Verbal pleas for legal action against 
the CD are coded as dissonance, not as repression, as they are not themselves actions or 
decisions. Repression should also be political in nature. This implies that when a member of 
the CD is arrested or convicted for insurance fraud or drug trafficking, this event is not coded 
as repression.  
Organizational fragmentation consists of the number of “defections” of party members. 
It includes statements made by CD members who announce their resignation or their refusal 
to take their seats in the local councils, as well as decisions by the party to abandon a member. 
These claims are excluded from the dependent variable by the CD. Note that expressions of 
loyalty or support for the party made by CD members are included in the count of CD claims. 
Statements of former CD members are included in resonance.  
Although I focus on short-term fluctuations, I will take unemployment, immigration, and 
the influx of asylum seekers into account as control variables, as they have often proved to be 
empirically relevant for explaining extreme-right party popularity (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; 
Golder 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002) and perhaps also influence access to 
the public discourse. These data were retrieved from Statistics Netherlands (CBS 2007, 2008). 
Because these are monthly rates, an extrapolation procedure was employed to create biweekly 
rates. However, these factors are clearly a better fit for theoretical frameworks that seek to 
explain long-term developments and for research designs that use longer units of analysis, 
such as months or quarters.  
Appendix A lists descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. The time sequence is a 
critical element: the cause (explanatory variable) has to precede the consequence (dependent 
variable) and, therefore, in both analyses the explanatory variables are lagged. Effects are as-




The variable claim making is an event count with discrete and non-negative values. King 
(1989) explains why ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is inappropriate for this outcome. 
Count variables are likely to display positive contagion: one count increases the likelihood of 
observing additional events in the same period. Observing both a large number of lower counts 
and very high counts (overdispersion) implies that we have more variability than is acceptable 
for an independent Poisson process and, therefore, a negative binomial regression will be used 
(Long and Freese 2006). The control variables unemployment rate, immigration, and influx of 
asylum seekers are change scores, because my expectation is that changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, rather than their absolute levels, affect claim making. The public opinion poll is 
log-transformed. Dickey-Fuller tests show that none of the variables contains a unit root after 
these transformations (see appendix B).  
To estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on public opinion support, I use 
ARIMA, also known as Box-Jenkins transfer modeling (e.g., McCleary and Hay 1980). For 
adequate Box-Jenkins modeling, the time series must be stationary, which means that the 
series has a constant mean and variance over time. Visual inspection of the opinion poll series 
(see figure 1) suggests that neither the mean nor the variance is stationary. Accordingly, the 
series is log-transformed and transformed into change scores. The explanatory variables are 
likewise inspected, and are logged and differenced when there is evidence of nonstationarity. 
For the ARIMA specifications of the variables, see appendix B. The residuals are “white noise,” 
which means that there is no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals.7  
 








Before presenting results of the multivariate regression models, I begin with a brief des-
cription of the two dependent variables: public opinion ratings and the CD’s rate of public 
claim making. Figure 1 shows that the CD experienced a wave of electoral support in the first 
half of the 1990s. While the party scored about one percent at the beginning of the time series 
(January 1992), support in the polls had risen to five percent of the vote by the end of 1993. 
The electoral breakthrough of the right-wing extremist party did not last long. In the national 
elections in May 1994, the party gained far less than expected: 2.5 percent of the vote. 
Figure 1 also shows that there was a wave of claim making in a relatively short time 
period (from January 1994 until May 1994). For the entire period, 121 claims are coded, most of 
which are made by party leader Janmaat. The surge started in January 1994 when Janmaat 
stated that he did not regret the death of Labor Party minister Dales. About one week later, he 
proclaimed (in an interview with Elsevier) that immigrants should not be allowed to hold 
public positions and that Minister Ballin should resign because of his Jewish ancestry. Not 
surprisingly, these statements provoked fierce criticism. That Janmaat gained more media 
access because he became more “newsworthy” can be illustrated with the fact that his further 
actions after these two statements are reported in unusual detail. Media report that Janmaat 
claimed that he was incorrectly quoted by Elsevier and that he sent a letter to Ballin to explain 
this mistake. The largest peak of claim making occurred around the municipal elections on 
March 2. A headline in NRC Handelsblad summarized a debate between the local party 
leaders in The Hague as follows: “Janmaat does most of the talking during political debate.” 
There were a considerable number of reactions during this period, ranging from the advice to 
not vote for the CD to pleas for a political boycott. In Eindhoven, activists threw a pie in the 
face of the local CD leader, and in Rotterdam the local Labor Party leader stated that it is 
“disgraceful that ten percent of the electorate votes for racists.” Negative publicity also 
peaked shortly before the Parliamentary Elections in May 1994 when a local CD member ad-
mitted (on hidden camera) that he had set fire to centers that provided services for foreigners.8  
 

























































Note: The thick line represents public claim making and the thin line shows public opinion support. The source for 
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Determinants of Public Claim Making  
 
Table 1 shows the results of a negative binomial regression with the number of claims as 
the dependent variable. The table reports the incidence rate ratio (IRR), which is the factor 
change in the expected count for a unit increase in the independent variable. The results reveal 
a strong effect of the lagged dependent variable, which indicates that the number of public 
claims is strongly affected by Janmaat’s presence in the public sphere one time lag earlier. 
Model 1 shows that one political statement or action of the extreme-right party in the public 
sphere increases the expected number of public claims in the following time period by a factor 
of 1.14, holding all other variables constant. The prominence given to previous claims has no 
additional impact. Thus, my hypothesis that both claim making and visibility will enhance the 
potential for actors to diffuse subsequent messages in the public sphere (hypothesis 2B) is 
only partially supported. 
Furthermore, the results refute hypothesis 1B: public claims advocating anti-immigration 
and anti-refugee policies do not seem to have fostered Janmaat’s access to the mass media 
arena. I have also checked to see if the total amount of claims on the immigration and 
integration issue (regardless of the tone) had an impact, but this variable does not yield 
significant results in any of my models. I will come back to this finding when I discuss the 
analysis of fluctuations in public opinion support.  
 
Table 1. Determinants of Public Claim Making of the Extreme-Right CD  
Model 1 (biweekly) Model 2 (biweekly) Model 3 (weekly) 
 
 Negative binomial 
regression   IRR  SE   IRR  SE   IRR  SE 
 Claims CD (t-1) 1.140** 0.061 1.166*** 0.067 1.272*** 0.067 
 Visibility (t-1) 1.010 0.276 0.989 0.226 0.995 0.190 
 Organizational 
fragmentation (t-1) 0.851 0.099 0.852 0.096 0.602*** 0.097 
 Dissonance (t-1) 1.181* 0.106 1.173* 0.097 1.585*** 0.156 
 Repression (t-1) 1.048 0.333 0.972 0.318 0.943 0.363 
 Negative immigration 
claims (t-1) 1.013 0.616 1.020 0.063 1.035 0.712 
 Public opinion support (t-1) 1.595** 0.318 1.564** 0.303 1.334* 0.226 
 Δ Unemployment (t-1)   1.163 1.845   
 Δ Asylum seekers (t-1)   0.999 0.042e-2   
 α (dispersion parameter) 1.333*** 0.292 1.131*** 0.396 1.043*** 0.406 
 Wald c2 26.2***  43.46***  90.97***  
 log pseudolikelihood -180.39  -177.01  -227.16  
 N 165  163  331  
Notes: IRR = incidence rate ratio; SE = robust standard error; e-2 = multiply times 10-2 * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
< 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
 
Next, I hypothesized that dissonance has a positive impact on claim making (hypothesis 
4B), based on the logic that, in terms of gaining more media access, “any publicity is 
favorable publicity.” The findings show that this indeed is the case. Hence, despite critics’ 
intentions, public criticism appears to be counterproductive since it does not diminish the 
media stage for populist leaders and their anti-immigration rhetoric. Interestingly, my ex-
pectation that repression has a negative impact on media access (hypothesis 6B) is not con-
firmed: it does not have a significant impact. Furthermore, although not significant, 
organizational fragmentation yields an effect in the expected (negative) direction on the 






amount of public claim making of the CD in the next time period (hypothesis 7A). Also, when 
long-term impacts are included (assuming that internal strife and repression permanently 
affects all following time periods), neither organizational fragmentation nor repression have a 
significant effect. 
Finally, the results show that public opinion (t-1) has a significant positive impact. These 
findings support the hypothesis that the more electoral support Janmaat received, the more he 
was able to express his viewpoints in the mass media (hypothesis 5). The general conclusion 
is that support from the general public (as indicated by opinion polls) and newsworthiness (as 
indicated by claim making or public reactions of others) fosters the party’s opportunity to 
further diffuse its standpoints in the public sphere. 
The addition of the two control variables, unemployment rates and the influx of asylum 
seekers (model 2), does not change the conclusions just drawn. They do not affect the number 
of claims by the CD in the subsequent time period.9 Another additional test with weekly 
(instead of biweekly) units of observation (model 3) reveals that the same mass media dy-
namics also clearly operate on a shorter time scale. The only remarkable difference is that 
resignations or expulsions of CD members have a negative, ephemeral effect on claim making. 
This could be due to the fact that closely clustered peaks of internal strife claims of the CD 
party simply took the place of “normal” media statements. Note that the effect of organi-
zational fragmentation on the other media variables, such as the number of dissonant claims, 
is not the focus of this study and could perhaps be positive.   
 
Determinants of Public Opinion Support  
 
The second question is how to explain changes in public opinion support for the CD. The 
results presented in table 2 show that hypothesis 2A does not find any support: remarkably, 
electoral attractiveness was not significantly influenced by the frequency or visibility of 
public claims Concerning the effect of dissonance, the findings support my expectation that 
critical reactions erode popular support for the CD (hypothesis 4A). All other things being 
equal, the coefficient (-0.06) indicates that one act of rejection produced an average decrease 
in support of about five per cent.10 Expressed in absolute terms, this yields a decrease from 
1.40 percent of the vote share (the average amount of support over this period) to 1.33 
percent. As mentioned earlier, CD claims and negative reactions are closely intertwined. 
Given that the average number of critical reactions is higher (mean = 1.28) than the average 
number of claims (mean = 0.73), this suggests that, overall, claim making was counter-
productive because it was frequently preceded or followed by a larger amount of criticism.11  
As for hypotheses 6A and 7A, the results show that neither repression nor organizational 
fragmentation caused a decline in support. Although the claims of CD members who 
abandoned the party or were expelled exert a negative impact in the expected direction, the 
effect is insignificant. Alternative models (not shown) that assume that these two variables 
have long-term cumulative effects do not significantly affect the opinion poll results either. 
Cross-correlation functions and time series plots indicate that the main peaks in organizational 
fragmentation and repression seem to have predominantly occurred parallel to, or after the 
decline in electoral support. If specified as an immediate effect (i.e., in the same time unit), 
“defection” severely harms the amount of public support. However, one should be cautious 
with the interpretation of this relationship. Presumably, members and voters reacted 
simultaneously and similarly—namely, they both ended their support for their party—to an 
unobserved external event (like the hidden camera story). 
Finally, the findings in model 1 undermine the presumed harmful role of a narrowing 
“political space” for mobilization on the issue of immigration and integration (hypothesis 
1A): Janmaat’s popularity was not affected when other political actors publicly expressed 
negative viewpoints on the multicultural society. Additional analyses (not shown) show that 
broadening the scope of this variable by also including neutral, ambivalent, and positive 
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political statements does not change this conclusion. This finding is in line with previous 
research that found that the number of articles on asylum seekers did not contribute to the 
explanation of over-time variance in right-wing voting in the Netherlands (Lubbers 2001) or 
in Germany (Lubbers and Scheepers 2001). At the same time, however, it contradicts 
Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart’s (2007) finding that immigration news coverage increased 
support for Dutch anti-immigration parties. It is important to note that their variable “news on 
immigration” includes what Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2007) label “news on real-world develop-
ments,” whereas political claim making on immigration represents a more bounded concept 
that is similar to “news on issue positions of parties.” These two different types of news do not 
necessarily coincide. Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder (1997) observed that, until the end of 
1993, newspapers and television news contained many stories on asylum seekers coming to 
the Netherlands, while the major Dutch parties were relatively silent on the issue during that 
period. Further research on the radical right can thus be improved by testing the “political 
space” argument and agenda-setting theory together in one framework by including both 
factual news coverage on immigration and political statements from established parties con-
cerning immigration policies.   
Model 2 in table 2 shows that the addition of two control variables does not affect the 
results. While changes in the influx of asylum seekers yield an insignificant effect, increases 
in joblessness were beneficial for the CD.12 Other scholars likewise found that higher rates of 
unemployment provide a favorable environment for the extreme right (Golder 2003; Jackman 
and Volpert 1996). For this Dutch case, Lubbers (2001) similarly found that when unemploy-
ment increased the likelihood of voting for the extreme right was greater; moreover, rising 
numbers of asylum seekers had no significant effect. The additional analysis of weekly fluctu-
ations (model 3) also confirms my earlier conclusions about the role of the public debate: 
public criticism and disapproval played a major role in diminishing the extreme-right party’s 
popularity. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Public Opinion Support for the Extreme-Right CD 
ARIMA regression Model 1 (biweekly) Model 2 (biweekly) Model 3 (weekly) 
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Claims CD (t-1)  0.014 0.032 0.006 0.038 -0.0001 0.024 
Visibility (t-1)  0.007 0.037 0.004 0.037 0.015 0.033 
Organizational 
fragmentation (t-1) -0.004 0.022 -0.014 0.021 -0.006 0.035 
Dissonance (t-1) -0.057*** 0.018 -0.056*** 0.015 -0.050** 0.020 
Repression (t-1) -0.014 0.048 0.015 0.045 -0.019 0.040 
Negative immigration 
claims (t-1) -0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.009 -0.0003 0.010 
 Δ Unemployment (t-1)   0.748** 0.333   
 Δ Asylum seekers (t-1)   -0.00002 -0.0001   
Moving average (t-1) -0.756*** 0.060 -0.816*** 0.049 -0.817*** 0.032 
AIC 156.01  151.74  436.81  
RMS (residual variance) 0.143  0.139  0.213  
Ljung-Box Q (20 lags) res 21.16  20.39  23.95  
Ljung-Box Q (20 lags) res2 14.31  10.90  30.55  
N 165  163  331  
Note: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test). 






SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
This article investigates fluctuations over time in the amount of electoral support for the Dutch 
extreme-right party, Center Democrats, and the party’s ability to express its opinions in the 
mass media. Previous studies on anti-immigration parties have taken the role of news cover-
age into account, but have mainly focused on explaining electoral support. I have argued that 
questions on the extreme-right party’s amount of public claim making should also be addressed. 
Demand-side theories stress that unemployment and immigration make voters susceptible 
to the message of the extreme right. However, the failure of these theories to provide an 
overall explanation “is clear from even a simple glance at the clear contrasts in radical right 
fortunes found between neighboring states which appear to share similar cultural values, post-
industrial service-sector economies, and comparable institutions of representative democracy” 
(Norris 2005: 14). In addition, we need supply-side theories, which emphasize the role of 
party characteristics (like organizational strength) and political constraints and opportunities. 
Of course, grievances, ethnic threats, and political opportunities are important for explaining 
why certain political changes are possible or likely, but they have to be made visible in the 
public discourse in order to become relevant. Therefore, I have added the argument that 
publicly visible (rather than latent) factors produce and amplify mobilization of support and 
attention. This discursive opportunity approach should not be seen as a “rival” theory that 
displaces existing explanations. Rather, it explains why mobilization can emerge and cease 
rapidly—on a scale of weeks or months, rather than years.  
Results show that it is fruitful to consider short-term dynamics in the public debate in 
order to fully understand fluctuations in extreme-right support and claim making. With regard 
to enhancing prominence in the eyes of the media gatekeepers, the findings support the idea 
that the strategy of putting radical-right actors “in a bad light” is counterproductive. Critical 
reactions by others in the public debate actually improved CD members’ access to the mass 
media. Furthermore, it was found that an increase in electoral support did improve the 
extreme-right party’s ability to make itself heard in the debate. This implies that the electoral 
growth during the first half of the 1990s amplified the party’s ability to communicate with 
potential voters. 
Importantly, however, negative reactions in the public debate significantly eroded 
electoral support. Dissonance—the extent to which the public stage offered more space for 
criticism than for CD claim making—was disastrous for the party’s electoral attractiveness. 
This conclusion is in line with the finding that a perceived lack of legitimacy among voters 
diminishes support for populist right parties (Bos and Van der Brug 2010), an insight which 
could be extended to the analysis of the fortunes of the radical right in other European 
democracies. Likewise, the combined hostile reactions of political parties, the mass media, 
and civil society actors led directly to the collapse of the radical-right Republicans in 
Germany; one of their leaders called the media campaign against the party “our chief problem” 
(Art 2007: 340).  
Remarkably, the CD’s public claim making did not affect the amount of electoral 
support. The only (external) factor that enhanced Janmaat’s popularity was an increase in 
joblessness (cf. Lubbers 2001). An increase in the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers 
did not translate politically into more support for the CD, nor did the amount of political space 
occupied by the established political actors. In sum, Hans Janmaat appeared trapped in a 
feedback loop of stagnation: he was not able to further increase electoral support by placing 
the CD’s topics on the agenda, regardless of how prominently the party’s claims appeared in 
the media. This is in remarkable contrast to more recent radical-right leaders who clearly 
profited from media prominence, like Pim Fortuyn (Koopmans and Muis 2009) and Geert 
Wilders (Bos et al. 2010). Vliegenthart et al. (2012) find that party visibility enhanced 
electoral support for five of the six anti-immigrant parties they investigated (VB, PVV, 
Republikaner, NPD, DVU): CD was the one exception. Thus, it is indeed unwarranted to state 
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that when the media are willing to grant extreme-right parties a voice, they are always able to 
achieve electoral breakthroughs (Ellinas 2009).  
I expect that the same reservation holds if we focus on the social movement side of the 
extreme right. Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann (2012: 213) conclude that in the countries 
they studied (Italy, Germany, and the United States) a dominant stigmatization of the extreme 
right’s racist and antidemocratic claims still seems effective. They point out that groups have 
strategically adapted their framing and repertoire to the specific discursive opportunities in the 
three different countries, supposedly in an attempt to broaden their appeal and overcome a 
negative feedback loop that is similar to the one I described above. 
Following a discursive opportunity approach adds two fruitful elements to prevailing 
explanations for the mobilization of populist right parties and movements. First, the 
identification of short-term discursive spirals and feedback mechanisms extends the more 
static demand- and supply-side explanations, which focus on gradual trends and cross-
national differences rather than on rapid fluctuations (Norris 2005). It is not clear how 
relatively stable political and socioeconomic circumstances can explain the sudden mobili-
zation of voters or attention shifts within the space of months. They do not predict a surge in 
1994, nor do they explain the sudden collapse shortly after. I share this dynamic view on the 
analysis of extreme-right breakthroughs with De Witte and Klandermans (2000), who point 
out that it is difficult to set into motion an upward spiral to overcome organizational 
weakness. My findings add that another important cause of downward spiral in public opinion 
support is a lack of “discursive strength.” Even when the CD entered the public stage, with 
the means to mobilize a wider audience, the party did not achieve much electoral success. To 
the contrary: once on the stage, the CD suffered from being publicly criticized as an unaccep-
table racist party. When we compare the demise of the CD with the sudden meteoric rise of 
the LPF in 2002, it stands out that its leader, Fortuyn, experienced a self-reinforcing spiral of 
media visibility and electoral popularity (Koopmans and Muis 2009). Consequently, small 
differences in initial conditions of two parties can generate potentially enormous difference in 
final outcomes, a phenomenon which is similar to the famous “butterfly effect” in chaos 
theory. The question remains, if a break of the circle of discursive weakness had been possible, 
would Janmaat have been inclined to modify his views or reframe his message in order to 
avoid widespread public disapproval? 
Second, a discursive opportunity approach points to the importance of the strategic 
choices of political players. Mudde (2007) argues that many studies have the tendency to 
assume that anti-immigration parties are undergoing their fates passively, instead of shaping 
their own destiny. Likewise, Goodwin (2006: 350) stated that extreme-right parties “should be 
viewed as engineers of their own success.” Ignazi (2003) and Caiani et al. (2012) similarly 
argue that extreme-right parties and movements exhibit a strategic flexibility to adapt to 
whatever favorable circumstances might arise. For example, Coffé (2005) argues that total 
exclusion has led far-right leaders of the Vlaams Blok to adjust their rhetoric; by softening 
strongly worded texts they broadened their electoral appeal. If outright racist claims provoke 
harsh criticism, one would expect that right-wing actors adopt a moderate populist stance in 
order to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments (Koopmans et al. 2005). Fortuyn perhaps pro-
vides an exemplar case: he could have learned from Janmaat’s failures. In any case, his political 
agenda clearly differed from that of the CD, since he promoted a civic instead of ethnocultural 
type of nationalism (Akkerman 2005). 
It appears that it would not only make sense to differentiate between “normal” and 
“unacceptable” (Hooghe and Reeskens 2007), “neofascist” and “populist” (Golder 2003), or 
“classical racist” and “culturally racist” (Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2007) extreme-right parties 
(despite their common issue agenda). In order to explain why certain parties develop into 
successful parties, it might also be fruitful to distinguish adaptive parties from ideologically 
rigid parties. Why certain parties choose a certain strategy remains a pressing question.  
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PAIRWISE PEARSON 
CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSES 
 
Biweekly Units (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Public claims CD           
(2) Support CD (%) .19          
(3) Unemployment (%) -.16 .13         
(4) Immigration -.14 .28 -.21        
(5) Asylum seekers .39 .22 .43 .19       
(6) Organizational fragmentation .25 -.09 .21 -.30 .19      
(7) Negative immigration claims .09 -.11 -.04 .16 .16 -.02     
(8) Repression .30 -.05 .18 -.18 .09 .34 -.14    
(9) Visibility .44 .15 .23 -.26 .19 .58 .09 .23   
(10) Dissonance .44 .10 .29 -.28 .24 .69 .03 .38 .62  
Mean 0.73 1.40 6.32 9,072 2,727 0.32 2.67 0.16 0.40 0.43 
SD 1.57 1.04 0.90 1413 1021 1.43 2.43 0.44 0.89 1.87 
Sum (N claims) 121     52 444 27  104 
 
 
APPENDIX B. DICKEY FULLER (DF) UNIT-ROOT TEST FOR STATIONARITY  
AND ARIMA MODELS OF VARIABLES (JANUARY 1992 TO MAY 1998) 
 
Biweekly Units Transfomation DF test statistic ARIMA model Box-Ljung Q (20 lags) 
Public claims CD  -8.72 AR (1,2,3) 25.15 
Support for CD (%) Log Dif -4.52 MA (1) 21.13 
Unemployment (%) Dif -6.13 MA (1,2) 24.62 
Immigration Log Dif -8.11 MA (1) 24.12 
Asylum seekers Log Dif -8.18 MA (1) 17.27 
Organizational fragmentation  -6.92 MA (1) 21.60 
Negative immigration claims  -10.55 AR (1,4) 17.78 
Repression  -10.74  27.86 
Visibility  -10.57 AR (1,2) 20.54 
Dissonance  -7.43 AR (1,8) 23.23 
Weekly Units Transformation DF test statistic ARIMA model Box-Ljung Q (20 lags) 
Support for CD (%)  Log Dif -14.26 MA (1) 21.13 
Organizational fragmentation  -26.94 AR (1,2,3,5) 30.50 
Negative Immigration claims  -9.88 AR (1,2) 16.09 
Repression  -15.63  21.73 
Public claims CD  -16.15 AR (1,5,6,9) 29.90 
Visibility  -14.78 AR (1,5) 23.07 
Dissonance  -14.49 AR (1,2,4,12) 25.20 
Notes: */** indicates that the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of unit-root at the (p< 0.01) and (p< 0.05) level 
respectively; the Box-Ljung Q indicates that the residuals are “white noise” (p < 0.05). 
Weekly Units (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6)     (7) 
(1) Public Claims        
(2) Support CD (%) .12       
(3) Organizational fragmentation .17 -.05      
(4) Negative immigration claims .09 .17 -.05     
(5) Repression .34 -.05 .24 -.11    
(6) Visibility .50 .18 .26 .16 .22   
(7) Dissonance .02 .10 .55 .02 .13 .27  
Mean 0.36 1.40 0.16 1.34 0.08 0.23 0.22 
SD 1.04 1.08 0.75 1.55 0.31 0.66 1.20 
Sum (N claims) 121  52 444 27  104 
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1 Scholars ofter use interchangeably the labels “extreme right,” “far right,” and “populist radical right.” Following 
Arzheimer (2009), Carter (2005), Koopmans et al. (2005), and others, this article will refer to the “extreme right” because 
it is a label commonly used in recent literature for the party family in question. 
2 With thanks to Thom Dyvené de Wit, who was responsible for coding these data.  
3 For more information on the sampling procedure and structure of claims, see Koopmans et al. (2005: 254-65). The 
original dataset is based on a sample: claims were coded from the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the 
newspaper. I have added claims with the CD as the actor or object from the missing days (using keyword search in 
the Lexis Nexis database) and have added supplementary information to the original claims (visibility scores, 
evaluation of the object actors, and specification of the different extreme-right actors). 
4 More details about the subsample for the reliability test are provided in Muis (2012). As it concerned 2001/2002, the 
radical-right party in question was the LPF. The procedure for the coding of political claims was the same, however. 
Three coders selected 51, 56, and 50 relevant articles, respectively, from a total of 1,472 articles in the newspaper 
during the three randomly chosen time periods to be coded. Regarding the calculation of the reliability of claim iden-
tification, each claim is considered as unique—i.e., each claim has its own unique value. 
5 First, it is important to note that the actual variables used in the analysis are created by combining and aggregating 
various claim variables. For instance, a claim counting as “dissonance” can be established in several ways: an actor 
can be directly (as addressee) or indirectly (as object) criticized; furthermore, actors can be mentioned as the first or 
second criticized actor. Second, for the variables “organizational fragmentation” and “repression,” unfortunately no 
informative reliability measure could be calculated, as these instances did not occur in the sample used for the test. 
Lack of variability yields an artificially high agreement of 100 percent. 
6 This variable is based on a sample in which the claims were coded from the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of 
the newspaper. 
7 See McCleary and Hay (1980: 243) for a discussion why “white noise” is necessary and cross-correlations between 
variables should be uncontaminated by autocorrelation within each series.  
8 This confession is not coded as a political claim, as it not a purposive action in the public sphere. All public 
reactions, however, are coded as claims, such as the public statement of a journalist that the explicit goal of the 
infiltration was to harm the party. 
9 This conclusion is similar when the immigration figures are used, rather than figures for the influx of asylum 
seekers, or when it is hypothesized that these variables operate with a longer delay (2 or 3 lags). 
10 The calculation is as follows: percentage change = [exp(coef) -1)]* 100 (McCleary and Hay 1980: 174). 
11 The original measure of dissonance (which does not subtract the number of CD claims from the number of critical 
reactions) yields a similar negative impact. In such a model, due to multicollinearity, the variable claim making has to 
be excluded from the analysis. Only including claim making (excluding the negative reactions variable) also yields a 
strong negative effect (not surprisingly, given the correlation). 
12 An alternative model with the changes in the amount of immigration instead of asylum seekers also yields 
insignificant results. Taking more distant lags (2 and 3), assuming that these variables might operate with a longer 
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